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freedom, democracy, equality and rule of law, the CCP use of these terms 
is markedly different.  
This article seeks to deconstruct the Core Socialist Values and to 
understand how each of the twelve values is defined, independently and in 
relation to other components. The article also explores, using a Gramscian 
analytical framework focused on the "integral state", how consensus to the 
state’s proscribed values is not undermined by competing discourses. 
Through an emergent Chinese “integral state” consideration is given to 
how civil society becomes the ground for building consensus, reinforced by 
coercive strategies emanating from the Chinese state.  In conclusion, the 
paper argues that the Core Socialist Values represent a shift in focus under 
the Xi administration to emphasize the superstrcutre over the economic 
base, with the objective of creating citizens of and for the People’s Republic 
of China. 
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ABSTRACT 
The Core Socialist Values have become a defining characteristic of the Xi Jinping 
era.  Under the umbrella of the Chinese Dream discourse, the Core Socialist Values 
represent a distillation and crystallization of the Xi administration’s vision for 
Chinese state-society-citizen relations. While using many terms found in western 
liberal political discourse, such as freedom, democracy, equality and rule of law, the 
CCP’s use of these terms is markedly different.  
 This article seeks to deconstruct the Core Socialist Values and to understand 
how each of the twelve values is defined, independently and in relation to other 
components. The article also explores, using a Gramscian analytical concepts, how a 
Chinese “integral state” is being prepared to ensure that consensus to the state’s 
proscribed values is not undermined by competing discourses. Through an emergent 
Chinese “integral state” consideration is given to how civil society becomes the 
ground for building consensus, reinforced by coercive strategies emanating from the 
Chinese state.  In conclusion, the paper argues that the Core Socialist Values 
represent a shift in focus under the Xi administration to emphasize the superstrcutre 
over the economic base, with the objective of creating citizens of and for the 
People’s Republic of China.    
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The Core Socialist Values of the Chinese Dream: Towards a Chinese Integral State 
 
国民者，以国为人民公产之称也. 
国者积民而成，舍民之外，则无有国. 
梁启超, 1899 
 
‘Citizens’ is the term for the people who collectively own the nation.  
A nation is the accumulation of its people’s achievements, without whom there would be no nation. 
Liang Qichao, 18991 
 
The Xi Jinping era began with cautious optimism for many China observers, yet has 
given way to concerns that Xi’s policies constitute a volte-face on social and political 
progress which, in the most ardent criticisms, constitute a regression to the Mao era2. 
Alongside clearly repressive actions against activists and a sweeping anti-corruption 
campaign, new policy initiatives seek to re-emphasize the leading the role of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) across both the repressive and ideological state 
apparatus. This includes directives instructing the state media to serve the CCP3; 
tighter regulation of the funding and registration of domestic and international non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) 4; the reiteration of CCP supremacy over the 
legal system5; the strengthening of political education in the compulsory and higher 
education sectors6, and intimidation, persecution and prosecution of various activists, 
lawyers and campaigners under charges of sedition and subversion. That these 
developments constitute evidence of the reassertion of illiberal politics cannot be 
disputed: these are the strategies of an authoritarian state. However, authoritarianism 
is not always solely characterized by coercion, and alongside such strategies there is 
clear evidence that the CCP is, through its propaganda infrastructure, pushing a range 
of consensus building activities under the umbrella of the Chinese Dream7 discourse. 
Most prominent amongst these is the Core Socialist Values campaign, which lays out                                                         
1 Liang 1899, 309. 
2 For one of the most in-depth analyses and criticisms, including comparisons between Xi’s policies 
and the mass campaigns of the Mao era, see Lam 2015.  
3 The 48 character policy announced by the People’s Daily on 20th February 2016 provides 12 four 
character phrases instructing the media in three broad categories: loyalty to the CCP, unity of the 
people and clarity of communication. See Bandurski 2016 
4 For background on this issue see Catá Backer 2015.  
5 Minzner 2015. 
6 See Ministry of Education 2011 “Opinions of the Ministry of Education CCP Group Opinions on the 
Implementation of Deepening Development of the Education System’s Patriotic Education. Available 
online at: http://www.moe.gov.cn/srcsite/A13/s7061/201601/t20160129_229131.html (Accessed 20 
April 2016).  
7 Italicized terms contained in the main text and footnotes have been translated from the original 
Chinese.  A full glossary of these terms, arranged alphabetically, is contained in Appendix 1 with 
English, pinyin and simplified Chinese.  
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 4 
the CCP’s vision through four goals at each of the national, societal and citizenship 
level.  
 The core approach of this article is to examine and interrogate the Core 
Socialist Values in order to understand how the CCP is expanding its appeal to 
resonate with the people over whom it wishes to exert its dominance. It is, first and 
foremost, a study of consensus building initiatives originating with the CCP and 
targeted at Chinese citizens, though it must be acknowledged that these activities 
constitute one side of a state-building project, complemented with a range of policies 
and responses which are aimed at negating and suppressing opposition to the state 
vision. Several concepts developed by Antonio Gramsci are introduced to illuminate 
these consensus building efforts, and to frame an exploration of the relationship 
between such efforts and the coercive and repressive activities also clearly evident.  
 The article adopts a critical approach which has, at its heart, an objective of 
understanding the trajectory of development in contemporary China. It begins by 
laying out the Gramscian concepts of hegemony, the integral state and common 
sense utilized in the analysis, along with discussion of these concepts in relation to 
contemporary China. It then proceeds to provide an account of the Core Socialist 
Values, drawing on CCP leader speeches, CCP theoretical publications and an 
analysis of several hundred propaganda posters published under the Chinese Dream 
propaganda campaigns 8 , further dissecting the national, societal and citizenship 
dimensions of the Core Socialists Values. Throughout this analysis, in addition to 
primary source materials, extensive reference is made to secondary literature. These 
secondary sources are drawn from across the fields of China Studies, Politics, 
Sociology, Law Studies and Chinese Philosophy. While a Gramscian lens is applied 
throughout, the concepts of hegemony, the integral state and common sense are 
reintroduced explicitly in the conclusion to offer a critical account of the Core 
Socialist Values, not merely as a rhetorical propaganda campaign, but as the 
centerpiece of a hegemonic state-building project focused on state-led reform and 
guidance of transformation of the superstructure.  
 
Gramsci: Hegemony and the Integral State 
Following the defeat of the Italian Communist movement by Mussolini, and his 
subsequent imprisonment, Gramsci sought to explain a paradoxical aspect of the                                                         
8 These Chinese Dream posters are all available for download at: 
http://www.wenming.cn/jwmsxf_294/zggygg/index_12218.shtml.  
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 5 
failure of revolution in advanced capitalist states: why, given the prevalence of 
capitalist exploitation in the advanced capitalist states of western Europe, did socialist 
revolution fail to foment and overthrow the ruling elites? Gramsci developed an 
‘arsenal of concepts’ 9  which located the durability of these advanced capitalist 
systems in a fortress of civil society which could survive intact even when the state 
was weakened by conflict. In employing the thought of Gramsci in analysis of 
contemporary China, the various concepts developed by Gramsci to survey the 
strength of advanced capitalist states in the early 20th century are appropriated to 
explore how the CCP is strengthening its leadership position through a process of 
consensus building. Gramscian approaches to the analysis of the contemporary 
Chinese condition can be found across a range of disciplines and research areas: Nigel 
Todd10, Arif Dirlik11 and Liu Kang12 have drawn clear parallels between the thought 
of Gramsci and the revolutionary strategies of Mao; Blecher uses Gramsci to frame 
explorations of workers’ protests and labour relations during the reform of state-
owned enterprises under Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji’s policies in the late 1990’s13;  
Zheng Yongnian utilizes a Gramscian framework to cast the CCP as “organizational 
emperor”14; Zhang Xiaoling applies Gramsci’s concept of hegemony to analyses of 
the Chinese state media sector15  and communications technology development16 ; 
Elena Mayer-Clement uses Gramsci to navigate the impact of marketization and 
commercialization of the film and music industri s upon CCP regime stability17, and 
Su Xiaobo develops a Gramscian analytical framework to interrogate the strategic use 
of ideology and the narratives of revolution and reform to pursue, attain and maintain 
hegemony in contemporary China18. More recently, Li Xing has utilized Gramsci’s 
concepts of hegemony, counter-hegemony and passive revolution to frame his 
                                                        
9 Laclau and Mouffe referred to an “arsenal of concepts” introduced by Gramsci through his 
“Selections from the Prison Notebooks”. See Laclau and Mouffe 2001, IX; Gramsci 1992. For an 
accessible introduction to the concepts, thought and legacy of Antonio Gramsci, see Hoare and Sperber 
2016. 
10 Todd 1974 
11 Dirlik 1983 
12 Liu 1997  
13 Blecher 2002  
14 Zheng 2009 
15 Zhang 2011 
16 Zhang and Zheng 2009 
17 Mayer-Clement 2015  
18 Su 2011  
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 6 
discussion of the Chinese Dream19, while Heidi Yu Huang provides an overview of 
the reception of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony in China itself20. 
 Gramscian hegemony differs from conventional uses of the term, moving 
away from simple equations with the military and economic dominance of one class 
over another to focus on the consensus between the ruling elite and wider society. 
Hegemony, in the Gramscian sense, is conceived as “consensus armored by 
coercion” 21 . Consensus, for Gramsci, extends beyond a simple equation with 
persuasion to refer to the participatory aspect of consensus. It is how people act, not 
necessarily how they think, which Gramsci emphasizes as the basis of consent and 
dissent. The parameters of consensus are initially determined by the state vision, in 
this case the Core Socialist Values, with negotiation over those parameters being the 
primary function of hegemonic activity. It is in this regard that Hobsbawm identifies 
Gramsci’s greatest contribution: his development of a Marxist theory of politics22.  
While domination can be achieved through simple coercive means, via the 
judiciary, legislature, military, paramilitary and other formal institutional structures, 
Gramscian hegemony is a form of domination reliant primarily on the negotiation of 
consent and active participation of citizens through civil society, which includes 
organizations as diverse as schools, universities, guilds, chambers of commerce, 
media outlets, non-governmental organizations, pressure groups, trade unions, 
churches and other religious organizations. Gramsci’s view of civil society stands in 
stark contrast to the term’s general use in common academic and journalistic contexts 
which characterize civil society more broadly, much as Charles Taylor proposed: “a 
web of autonomous associations independent of the state, which binds citizens 
together in matters of common concern and by their existence of actions could have 
an effect on public policy”23. As Alagappa argues, such definitions reify civil society 
as a normative ideal, containing within it “the potential to liberate citizens from the 
oppressive state and to confer full economic and political freedom on them”24.  
In contrast to definitions offered by Taylor and Alagappa, Gramsci’s civil 
society combines with political society to form what he calls the integral state. With 
regards to hegemony, the integral state constitutes the arena in which hegemony is 
maintained, via coercive methods actualized through the formal institutions of                                                         
19 Li 2015  
20 Huang 2015 
21 Gramsci 1992, 263.  
22 Hobsbawm 1977 
23 Taylor 1995, 204  
24 Alagappa 2004  
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 7 
political society, and via consensus, which is contested and negotiated through civil 
society. This dual characteristic can also be expressed as the ruling elite’s ability to 
exercise leadership through consensus building with allied social groups, while 
antagonistic social groups are the subject of coercive strategies aimed at pre-empting, 
negating or punishing challenges to the ruling elite. For Gramsci, force and consent 
are inseparable elements of hegemonic dominance. As Gramsci explains: “the 
(integral) state is the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which 
the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the 
active consent of those over whom it rules”25. This view challenges definitions which 
reify civil society as a domain of free association and expression where the state is 
subject to challenge from non-state actors. Instead civil society is conceived of by 
Gramsci as an arena of ideational contest in which the subaltern groups negotiate the 
terms of their continued domination by the ruling elite. Hegemony exists when there 
is large scale consensus to the values, dispositions and beliefs of the ruling elite. It is 
for this reason that the Core Socialist Values are analyzed as the potential basis for a 
Chinese integral state. 
 
From Philosophy to ‘Common Sense’ 
Crucial to the process of negotiating consensus is Gramsci’s differentiation between 
‘good sense’, which Gramsci compares to coherent philosophy, and ‘common sense’, 
which “enters the consciousness of the masses as part of their confounded and 
fragmentary”26 world view. Where a coherent philosophy or set of values is devised 
and disseminated by a ruling elite, such as the Core Socialist Values, Gramsci argues 
that “the document of its historical effectiveness”27  lies not in the complete and 
unconditional acquiescence or brainwashing of those over whom the ruling elite wish 
to exert dominance, but that such efforts “leave behind a sedimentation of ‘common 
sense’”28. It is this ‘common sense’, shared in and across groups which prepares the 
terrain and enhances the possibility of hegemony: “Common sense is the folklore of 
philosophy, and is always half-way between folklore properly speaking and the 
philosophy, science and economics of the specialists. Common sense creates the 
folklore of the future, that is as a relatively rigid phase of popular knowledge at a 
                                                        
25 Gramsci 1992, 244 
26 Rupert 1995, 30 
27 Gramsci 1992 
28 Gramsci 1992, 326 
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 8 
given place and time.”29. Put simply, ‘common sense’ is a canon of knowledge that 
frames our understanding of society; that is shared intersubjectively across disparate 
communities, social groups and the general population, and which exists at such a 
depth that the mere possibility of questioning it does not occur.  
 Common sense, understood in this way, constitutes the genetic building blocks 
of cultural power. While many may view CCP propaganda as nothing more than 
rhetoric, the sincerity, or lack thereof, of the communications between the Chinese 
state and its citizens does not necessarily diminish their transformative potential. 
Rather, rhetoric is a key strategic weapon in the reproduction and transformation of 
common sense over time and crucial to the mobilization of common sense in service 
of the interests of the state. The extent to which a ruling elite is successful in having 
their values absorbed into common sense, the greater likelihood that common sense 
will come to reflect those values and contribute to consensus building between the 
state and its citizens. As Fontana observes, the distinction between knowledge and 
opinion breaks down in hegemonic contexts, with hegemony encapsulating a “dual 
and reciprocal movement – the passage from knowledge to opinion and from opinion 
to knowledge” 30. 
While Gramsci conceived of the concepts of hegemony, the integral state and 
common sense to reveal the durability of advanced capitalism, and simultaneously to 
explain the failure of socialist revolution, these concepts offer a framework for the 
analysis of the Core Socialist Values as one aspect of state-building under the Xi 
administration. Through approaching the Core Socialist Values from a Gramscian 
perspective, they take on a potentially transformative power which demands further 
enquiry. With Gramsci’s concepts in mind, we will now turn to an interrogation of the 
Core Socialist Values. 
 
Core Socialist Values 
Since the ascension of Xi Jinping to the CCP leadership at the 18th Party Congress in 
November 2012, a major publicity campaign has been undertaken to disseminate 
Core Socialist Values31. Core Socialist Value propaganda is most visible through the                                                         
29 Gramsci 1992, 326 
30 Fontana provides an in-depth discussion of this in his article “The Democratic Philosopher: Rhetoric 
as Hegemony in Gramsci”. Parallels are drawn between Gramsci’s common sense and Plato’s doxa, 
which refers to opinion given by rhetorical speech. This contrasts with Gramsci’s good sense, which is 
compared to the Platonic concept of episteme as knowledge given by dialectical speech. See Fontana, 
2005, 119.  
31 Mahoney 2014 
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 9 
blanket coverage of poster art and digitized forms of propaganda posters. These are 
developed and disseminated through the CCP publicity infrastructure32 under the 
CCP Propaganda Department (CCPPD) and the Central Guiding Committee for 
Building Spiritual Civilization (CGCBSC) at the various administrative levels: 
national, provincial, municipal, district and community33. In addition, the publicity 
offices of state media and publishing houses also appear in more prominent, large-
scale and widespread, propaganda displays 34 . At all administrative levels, these 
posters are labeled as public information advertisements under a national campaign 
called “Stressing Civilization, Building a New Culture”. All publicity materials are 
also collated and publicized online through wenming.cn, a website jointly 
administered by the CCPPD and the CGCBSC.   
 
Figure 1 Digital Screen displaying the Core Socialist Values 
 
(INSERT FIG.1 HERE) 
 
These posters are seen at bus stops across the country.  This poster is specifically for Suzhou, showing the Core 
Socialist Values with an image depicting landmarks in Suzhou industrial Park, Suzhou, Jiangsu Province. The bus 
stop is located in Dushu Lake Science and Education Innovation District, part of Suzhou Industrial Park. Photo: 
Michael Gow 
 
This campaign, a component of the Xi administration’s hallmark political discourse of 
the Chinese Dream35, has been rolled out across all state media platforms, including 
television, newspapers, radio, billboards, posters and, increasingly, via social media 
platforms including Sina Weibo and Tencent WeChat. Television commercials appear 
on China’s national broadcaster, CCTV, and on provincial television channels. Even a 
popular children’s cartoon, Big Head Son and Little Head Dad, broadcast on CCTV, 
has been utilized as a method of dissemination36. The high visibility campaign is 
virtually inescapable. The aesthetics and artwork of propaganda posters draw on 
traditional arts and crafts produced by Chinese artists, including sculpture from                                                         
32 Shambaugh provides a detailed analysis of the propaganda infrastructure under the first Hu Jintao 
administration (2002-2007) which still holds largely true, save for personnel changes. See Shambaugh 
2007. 
33 For example, Municipal Publicity Department and the Municipal Spiritual Guidance Committee 
34 For example, the Xiamen Daily Press; China Network TV, or People’s Daily or Xinhua Media.  
35 The term “China Dream” is used extensively in academic literature and commentary on China. 
However, “Chinese Dream” is the official translation and is used exclusively in official translations of 
CCP and PRC government English language materials.  
36 Twelve “Big Head Son, Little Head Dad” Core Socialist Values episodes can be viewed online at: 
http://tv.cntv.cn/video/VSET100213790433/824f99eeee024fc5abfa1e4c37bfa6c2 (accessed 18 April 
2016) 
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 10
Tianjin, Shandong and Guangdong; intricate paper arts from Jiangsu, Shanxi and 
Hebei, and various styles of traditional painting from Shanghai, Heilongjiang, Henan 
and Shaanxi.  
 
Figure 2 Chinese Dream Propaganda Poster 
 
(INSERT FIG 2. HERE) 
 
Chinese Dream, My Dream. The figurine featured is named Chinese Dream Baby and features in animated digital 
media and traditional poster communications. The figurine is Tianjin clay pottery by artists Zhang Caisu and Lin 
Gangzao.  The photo was taken on Century Avenue, Pudong, Shanghai. Photo: Michael Gow 
 
The imagery and tone of the political messages is both striking, in artistic terms, and 
subtle, in the communication of apparently apolitical traditional Chinese values. The 
campaign lays out a vision for the dialectical relationship between nation, society and 
the citizen and constitutes a crystallization of the CCP’s values which stand in 
contrast to western liberal values. Furthermore, it eschews the indoctrination of 
Marxist dogma, which is largely absent in terms of slogans and aesthetics, in favour 
of aligning notions of citizenship with Confucian ethical concepts including filial 
piety, self-cultivation and the morally superior person. 
 
Core Socialist Values: Reforming the Superstructure 
The primary emphasis throughout the post-reform era has been to promote strategies 
to transform the economic base, but the Xi administration’s reforms and policy 
campaigns place a greater weighting on transformation of the superstructure. This 
indicates a concern amongst the current CCP leadership regarding the ethical, moral 
and ideological transformation of Chinese society. Alongside economic performance, 
national rejuvenation and competent governance, this emphasis on values relates to 
social stability as one of the constitutive elements of the CCP’s “performance 
legitimacy” 37  which it promotes as the irrefutable evidence of its suitability for 
continued governance. This emphasis on ethics and morality is revealed in political 
speeches including several given by Xi Jinping:  
 
“We need to energetically foster and promote core socialist values; 
promptly establish a value system that fully reflects Chinese                                                         
37 Zhu. 2011. 
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characteristics, our national identity, and the features of the times; 
and strive to occupy the leading position on this issue. Ethical values 
play a very important role among core values. Without morals, a 
country cannot thrive, and its people cannot stand upright. Whether 
or not a nation or an individual has a strong sense of identity largely 
depends on their morals. If our people cannot uphold the moral 
values that have been formed and developed on our own soil, and 
instead indiscriminately and blindly parrot Western moral values, 
then it will be necessary to genuinely question whether we will lose 
our independent ethos as a country and a people. Without this 
independent ethos, our political, intellectual, cultural and 
institutional independence will have the rug pulled out from under 
it.” 
Xi Jinping38 
Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 
February 17, 2014 
 
In an article published by Qiushi, the theoretical journal of the CCP, Liu Qibao39 
asserted that “where a nation and country are concerned, the longest lasting and most 
profound force are the core values commonly r cognized by the whole society”40. 
Prior to the 18th Party Congress, outgoing CCP leaders, including General Party 
Secretary Hu Jintao41 and NPC Chairman Wu Bangguo42, rejected the notion of 
adopting a “western” political system. However, in a second speech, Xi Jinping 
acknowledges the strength of values in western liberal democracies and identifies the 
pervasive effect those values have in framing legal, regulatory and policy initiatives. 
In doing so, Xi indicates an admiration for the stability conveyed upon western 
nations by their shared values, pervasive through civil society and guaranteed 
through their institutionalized status. This continues from and complements Xi’s 
preceding speech, cited earlier, that China’s values must develop to reflect Chinese 
                                                        
38 Xi 2014a, 120-121.  
39 Liu Qibao is Head of the CCP Publicity Department. See Liu 2014.  
40 Liu 2014.  Creemiers 2015 has provided a translation of this article at: 
 https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/10/15/propaganda-chief-liu-qibao-elaborates-
chinas-indigenous-development-path/ (Accessed 18 April 2016).  
41 Hu 2012 
42 Wu 2011 
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tradition and prevailing national conditions with both speeches constituting a 
rationale for Chinese exceptionalism:  
 
Core socialist values should not only be cultivated and fostered by 
improving people’s ways of thinking and encouraging good habits, 
but should also be guaranteed by institutions and mechanisms. 
Western countries are very good at this. Even though their 
governing parties alternate in power every four or five years, their 
values are stable and consistent. One important reason for this is 
that the design of their systems, the formulation of their policies, 
laws and regulations, and their judicial and administrative actions 
are all governed by their core values.  
Xi Jinping43 
Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, 
February 24, 2014 
 
The first mention of Core Socialist Values came from Hu Jintao on the 8th 
November 2012, in his last duty as General Party Secretary before handing over the 
reins to Xi Jinping. In his final report delivered at the 18th Party Congress, Hu 
proclaimed that the CCP should “promote prosperity, democracy, civility and 
harmony; uphold freedom, equality, justice and rule of law, and advocate patriotism, 
dedication, integrity and friendship, so as to cultivate and observe Core Socialist 
Values”44.  These values have since been clearly categorized under three levels: 
Prosperity, democracy, civility and harmony correspond to the national level; 
freedom, equality, justice and rule of law constitute societal values, and patriotism, 
dedication, integrity and geniality are the values associated with citizens.  
  
Figure 3  The Core Socialist Value Tree 
 
(INSERT FIG 3. HERE). 
 
                                                        
43 Xi 2014a, 122-123. 
44 Hu 2012 
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This poster shows the Core Socialist Values tree, a common poster seen across China. It is displayed 
here by an elevator at the Vanguard Shopping Mall on Jinliang Road in Suzhou Industrial Park. The 
poster displays the national (orange), societal (blue) and citizen (green) values. Photo: Michael Gow 
 
Liu Yunshan45 states that the Core Socialist Values “represent a more concentrated 
expression, clearly spelling out the values that the state, society, and citizens should 
aspire to, incline towards, and act by”46. These values are substantively impacted by 
their categorization at the national, societal or citizen level. They must be understood 
as constitutive elements of hegemonic47 projects at the national, societal and citizen 
levels, not as independent values and goals in and of themselves.  
 
National Core Socialist Values: Prosperity, Democracy, Civility and Harmony 
Both prosperity and harmony form a link with the Hu Jintao era, extending the dual 
objectives associated with Hu Jintao’s Scientific Outlook on Development of 
establishing a harmonious society and a moderately prosperous society48.  They are 
joined by two other concepts, democracy and civility, forming four national 
characteristics which the CCP wishes to characterize the modern Chinese nation by 
2049.   
 
Figure 4  Harmonious Motherland, Peaceful Families 
 
(INSERT FIG 4. HERE) 
 
This poster from the “Pictures Tell Our Values” series displayed on a giant LED screen at the Suzhou 
International Expo Centre. The poster slogan reads “Harmonious Motherland, Peaceful Families” above the 
smaller text lisitng the Core Socialist Values.  Photo: Michael Gow 
 
                                                        
45 Liu Yunshan is the 5th ranking member of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee who oversees the 
entire propaganda infrastructure of both the CCP and PRC government. Between 1993-2002 he served 
as Deputy Head of the CCP Propaganda Department (CCPPD) and was Head of the CCPPD for the 
entirety of the Hu Jintao administration from 2002-2012. Since 2012 Liu has become Chairman of the 
Central Guidance Committee on Building Spiritual Civilization (CGCBSC); Leader of the CCP Central 
Leading Group on Propaganda and Ideological Work (CLGPIW), and President of the CCP Central 
Party School. He has maintained positions of central importance to the ideological work of the CCP 
under Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping, a period spanning well over 20 years. See Shambaugh 
2007; Dotson 2012.  
46 Liu Yunshan 2014 
47 Hegemony is used here in its Gramscian sense, whereby the ruling elite aims to build consensus to its 
values, dispositions and vision through a process of consensus building via civil society. Hegemonic 
projects are the deliberate strategies devised within political society and mobilized through civil society 
to engage the populous in serving the ruling elite’s interests.  Gramsci 1992; Hoare and Sperber 2016 
48 Solé-Farràs 2008. 
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Perry considers it “noteworthy” that democracy is ranked after prosperity in 
importance49, yet an alternative interpretation is that these four national values are 
interdependent: greater than the sum of their constituent parts. Perry also notes that 
the interpretation of democracy “seeks to elide the fundamental contradiction between 
Enlightenment values and illiberal politics”50, revealing a conceptualization which 
“refers to something quite different from what American social scientists generally 
have in mind when we debate the prospects for China’s democratization”51. It is a 
contention which finds confirmation in the statement by Hu Jintao that China “will 
never copy a Western political system”52. 
Harmony informs the internal CCP practices guided by the Leninist concept of 
democratic centralism, allowing for democratic debate, discussion and development 
of policy within the CCP, but also requiring a united front precluding the possibility 
of dissenting opinion once policy directions have been decided upon53 . It is an 
approach which replaces the competitive aspects of western liberal democracy to 
emphasize harmony in the political process which is itself, in turn, illustrative of 
civility.  
Experiments with deliberative democracy in China have spawned a focus of 
scholarly enquiry over the past decade54.  Tang argues that deliberative democracy is 
possible in China, even though the political system is resistant to liberal democratic 
electoral reform55, identifying processes whereby discussion of the best method to 
refine and enact policy is acceptable, but where direct challenges, injurious to the 
concept of harmony and considered to be uncivilized political contests, are not. These 
discussions further highlight the dislocation of democratic contests, concerned with 
the selection of political representatives, from the process of democratic participation 
which is the defining characteristic of democracy in the Core Socialist Values.  
 Harmony not only informs understandings of democratic participation, it also 
relates to the value of civility at the national level.  In a speech given at the UNESCO 
Headquarters on 17th March 2014, Xi Jinping spoke at length about the need to 
                                                        
49 Perry 2015 
50 Perry 2015, 903 
51 Perry 2015, 905 
52 Hu 2012 
53 Lenin defined democratic centralism whereby criticism of suggested Party action is permissible, but 
only before a course of action has been decided upon. See Lenin 1906 
54 For detailed discussion on the introduction and adaptation of deliberative democracy in the Chinese 
context, see Lieb and He 2006, 
55 Tang 2014  
Page 14 of 46
URL: https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rcra
Critical Asian Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 15
respect different civilizations56. There are several implications of this speech: that 
Chinese civilization is different from others; that parochial or ethnocentric judgments 
about other cultures are unacceptable, and that civilizations can be viewed as different, 
but not as superior or inferior. Kallio draws attention to Xi Jinping’s claim that 
Chinese civilization should be characterized by a capable administration, thriving 
culture, economic development, stability and a unified people57 . Civility is often 
linked to the rejuvenation of the nation, a concept which is itself inextricable from the 
teleological goals of national prosperity and the moderately prosperous society. 
 
Societal Core Socialist Values: Freedom, Equality, Justice and Rule of Law 
The four societal values provide perhaps the most contentious definitions when 
compared with their common sense58 meanings in western liberal political discourse. 
In an article entitled “How to understand ‘freedom’ of the Core Socialist Values”59, 
Xu Nengyi60 acknowledges the origins of the concept of freedom, beginning with 
early Enlightenment thinkers in 17th century Europe before providing a contrasting 
definition of freedom. That freedom is categorized here as a societal value is a 
distinction within the Core Socialist Values discourse which serves to emphasize the 
elevation of society above that of the individual. Xu identifies the collective nature of 
the people’s freedom as distinct from western freedom choosing to emphasize the 
“great cause of the people’s (collective) freedom to push forwards”. Freedom, then, 
necessitates the placement of limitations upon personal freedom when it infringes on 
the rights of society to progress, with the trajectory of that progression delimited by 
the CCP.  Harmony and participatory democracy are reinforced at the societal level 
through the concept of a people’s freedom, with mass activity within the confines of 
the CCP vision constituting the contribution of Chinese people in the realization of 
the Chinese Dream.   
 
Figure 5 Societal Core Socialist Values:  
 
(INSERT FIG 5. HERE)                                                         
56 Xi 2014b, 283-289 
57 Kallio 2015  
58 Gramsci’s ‘common sense’ is thought that is common to a group or common to society as a whole, 
and concerns how a ruling class may develop strategies to intervene and shape common sense to serve 
their own objectives. For further explanation see Jones, S. 2006, 53-55. 
59 Xu 2015 
60 Xu Nengyi is Deputy Editor of Dangjian, the journal of the CCP Publicity Department.  
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This poster campaign follows the exploits of characters Beibei and Jing Jing as they demonstrate the essence of 
Core Socialist Values across settings familiar to younger school children.  This example shows the societal values 
of freedom, equality, justice and rule of law. This poster series is commonly seen in kindergartens, schools, parks, 
community and youth centres. Photo taken at Landsea International Residential Compound Badminton Court, 
Jinliang Road, Suzhou. Photo: Michael Gow 
 
Widening income disparity within cities; between urban and rural populations, and 
between coastal and inland provinces, represents a major challenge in light of the 
stated Two Centenary Goals61. Feng notes that equality will be measured by two key 
indicators relating to the first centenary goal to be achieved by 2021: the equalization 
of access to public services and the narrowing of income disparity and the wealth 
gap62. Equality is framed in terms of society: rather than being an objective to ensure 
the equality between individuals, it approaches equality as an objective that should be 
pursued through policy initiative. Kongshøj discusses initiatives aimed at increasing 
coverage of the welfare state, highlighting the impact of decentralized governance in 
the PRC. Nevertheless, Kongshøj 63  argues that local experiments have come in 
response to stated national objectives of integrating the social insurance schemes of 
urban and rural hukou holders, and that “as so often seen before in Chinese history, 
local experiments often point to future national-level policies”64.   
 Interpretations of justice and rule of law reinforce the underlying logic of 
freedom of society over freedom of the individual, and the maintenance of social 
order. Xi Jinping has highlighted that upholding justice has a role to play in 
conferring legitimacy upon the CCP, making a commitment in February 2013 to 
“make every effort to ensure that people feel that justice is served in every court 
case”65. This pledge for justice must, however, be understood in relation to socialist 
rule of law which is at odds with western conceptions of rule of law. Socialist rule of 
law was written into the constitution of the People’s Republic of China in 1999, with 
Article 5 of the Constitution amended to state that the “People’s Republic of China 
governs the country according to the law and establishes the nation under socialist 
rule of law”. In Chinese legal discourse, rule of law is contrasted with rule of man, yet 
there is also a distinction between interpretations of rule of law. The term rule of law  
is an abbreviated term in Chinese which can refer to both socialist rule of law and                                                         
61 Xi 2014c, 60  
62 Feng 2015  
63 Kongshøj 2015 
64 Kongshøj 2015, 581 
65 Xi 2014d, 161 
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western conceptions of rule of law. This is often expressed in English language 
scholarship on Chinese law as the distinction between “rule of law” and “rule by law”.  
Orts 66  provides a discussion of these concepts as they relate to China’s legal 
development, and argues that both are essential in understanding the trajectory of 
China’s legal reform in the post reform era. Orts also offers distinctions between the 
two differing conceptual relationships between the law and the state. According to 
Orts, “Rule of Law”, the concept most clearly associated with legal systems in 
western liberal systems, constitutes: 
 
“a normative and political theory of the relationship (between) legal 
institutions and the political state that includes, but is not limited to, 
a theory of limited government through some form of constitutional 
separation between the judiciary and other state powers”67.  
 
Conversely, the concept of “rule by law” that is most often associated with 
the law in China refers to:  
 
“the use of legal rules in order to assure the uniformity and 
regularity of an existing legal system, regardless of its more general 
political or moral properties. In this sense, even a grossly 
authoritarian legal system may qualify as ruling by law.”68 
The Core Socialist Values, however, refer to a societal value of rule of law, not “rule 
by law”, requiring a further examination of the Chinese terms. With regards to 
socialist rule of law, the term yīfǎzhìguó reveals the objective to establish “a nation 
ruled according to the law” which can be more associated more closely with Orts’ 
definition of “rule by law”. This differs from a similar term, yǐfǎzhìguó, more closely 
associated with western conceptions of rule of law, which advocates “a nation ruled 
by means of the law” 69  and which reflects Orts’ definition of “rule of law”. 
Consequently, the CCP’s claims to embrace and promote the “rule of law” are often 
dismissed as rhetoric, yet such claims ignore this distinction between yīfǎzhìguó and 
yǐfǎzhìguó.                                                          
66 For a full discussion on “rule of law” vs “rule by law” in China, see Orts, 2001. 
67 Orts, 2001, 93. 
68 Orts, 2001, 93. 
69 For a detailed analysis of the linguistic distinctions between these two terms see Shick-Chen, A., 
2007  
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The Fourth Plenum of the 18th Party Congress became the first CCP Central 
Committee Plenary Session on the Rule of Law, resulting in a document entitled 
“Some Major Questions in Comprehensively Advancing Governing the Country 
According to Rule of Law”70. Peerenboom documents both the optimism of some 
legal scholars ahead of the Fourth Plenum and the abject pessimism of many critics 
whose position is committed to the notion that “Socialist Rule of Law is an 
oxymoron” 71 . Peerenboom acknowledges that the Fourth Plenum resulted in a 
definition of Socialist Rule of Law that is “normatively…an emphatic rejection of the 
globally dominant liberal democratic conception of rule of law”72. Socialist Rule of 
Law is a mechanism for serving the teleological modernization projects constitutive of 
the Chinese Dream, a fact which categorizes Socialist Rule of Law as a form of “rule 
by law”. Critics claim that Socialist Rule of Law places the CCP above the law, yet 
this is a defining and intentional characteristic of Socialist Rule of Law. However, 
while the CCP itself remains above the law, the ongoing anti-corruption campaign 
increasingly provides CCP members with little protection from the full force of the 
law73, though any officials subject to legal prosecution are first expelled from the 
CCP74. Defining Socialist Rule of Law in service of the CCP’s political projects 
repositions the emphasis of justice: not justice for individuals and the protection of 
rights, but justice for social order which, in turn, provides freedom for the progression 
of society and the benefit of all people.  
 
Citizen : Patriotism, Dedication, Integrity and Friendship 
The Core Socialist Values propaganda campaign conceptualizes the citizen as 
subordinate to the nation and society, yet also defines citizenship as constitutive of 
and crucial to the realization of the Chinese Dream at the national and social levels. In 
this regard, the CCP vision for the citizen in contemporary China is that of a duty-
bound actors: patriotic and dedicated citizens are essential for the realization of 
national rejuvenation and establishment of a prosperous nation; integrity and geniality 
help bring about civility and harmony, and democracy is inextricably linked to the                                                         
70 Full document available at: http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2014/1029/c64387-25927606.html  
71 Peerenboom 2015, 55  
72 Peerenboom 2015, 55 
73 Pei Minxin discusses the culture of fear now gripping the sphere of officialdom, introducing the term 
“miaosha” which he translates as “instant kill”, though it is borrowed from online gaming culture and is 
better translated into English as a “headshot”. See Pei 2016.  
74 The anti –corruption drive is pursued first through extra-judicial investigations under the double 
designation system, conducted by the CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), 
before being passed to the People’s Procuratorate for formal criminal proceedings. See Sapio 2008. 
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willing participation of the citizenry in this process. In the view of the state, a society 
that is free, equal, fair and administered according to the law requires a citizenry with 
these qualities. 
 
Citizenship as a Social Relationship with the State 
The CCP, in developing the Core Socialist Values, has reduced the citizen to the 
status of a social actor whose agency is subsumed under their responsibility to 
contribute to societal and national objectives.  This reduction requires analysis in 
order to understand why it is unlikely to be rejected outright, and why it may resonate 
with the citizenry, constituting a reasonable framing of state-society-citizen relations 
in the Chinese context.   
The Chinese sociologist Fei Xiaotong’s identification of Chinese culture as a 
“differential mode of association”75 is particularly useful in elaborating an explanation 
of how the CCP are attempting to reify citizenship in terms of its relationship to the 
CCP’s vision for a modern China. Fei’s model describes a series of concentric circles 
emanating from a social actor, imbuing it with an “ego-centric” characteristic.  
However, ego-centrism in Fei’s model is not to be confused with individualism, 
whereby a person’s identity is independent of social relationships76. Henry Rosemont 
Jr. attributes the centrality of individualism in western political thought to the 
philosophical arguments of thinkers from Hobbes through to Rawls77. However, the 
notion of the individual likely comes from Judeo-Christian thinking, as beings created 
in the image of God, and itself informs the development of political documents such 
as the American Declaration of Independence which appropriates Judeo-Christian 
notions of the individual: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are 
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, 
that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness”78. Small wonder that 
western liberal political and civil society has evolved to espouse this normative 
perspective so evangelically. In contrast, Fei defines the differential mode of 
association as a “system of social networks linking people together in multiple ways 
                                                        
75 This concept is contrasted with the “organizational model of association” which Fei argues 
characterizes western societies. See Fei 1992, 60-70.  
76 Henry Rosemont Jr discusses the absurdity of suggestions that people in western societies are not 
social beings, but qualifies this by arguing that “our sociality is at best peripheral in modern Western 
political and moral theory”. See Rosemont Jr 2008, 47. 
77 Rosemont Jr 2008. 
78 Italics, author’s emphasis.  Full text of the American Declaration of Independence is available at: 
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/declaration_transcript.html (Accessed 18 April 2016).  
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and placing different, though clear-cut, moral demands on each person in each 
specific context”79.  
 
Fig 6.  Differential Model of Association  
 
(INSERT FIG 6. HERE) 
 
Image: Michael Gow 
 
Fei’s model emphasizes the dynamics of Confucian hierarchies in Chinese social 
relations; that the self is defined in terms of its relationships with others, necessitating 
adherence to the culturally-bound codes of etiquette, protocol and convention. These 
superior-subordinate hierarchies are not systems of total dominance, but convey what 
Madsen describes as “complementary reciprocity” upon both parties, manifest 
through mutually reinforcing moral behaviour80. Crucially, social relations are not 
based on voluntary association, but on moral obligation. The “ego” at the centre of 
Fei’s system of concentric circles is not autonomous, but exists only through the 
moral obligations of the relationships which constitute them as a social being: “there 
is, in principle, no self outside of roles and relationships”81. Confucian thought asks 
the question, are we “human beings”? or “human becomings”?82, accentuating the 
nuanced Confucian perspective that humanity is not an inherent property of people, 
but an expression between people. As Gao states: “a Chinese male, for example, 
would view himself as a son, a brother, a husband and a father, but hardly as 
himself…in essence a person can never separate him or herself from (their) 
obligations”83 . Nosco also highlights this as an identifying feature of Confucian 
conventions, noting that “Confucianism would reject the notion of a human person as 
an individual, if by this term one means to suggest the presence of a free and 
autonomous self”84. The role of the citizen as defined by the Core Socialist Values, 
and the relationship between citizens and the state, follows the Confucian, relational 
logic of Fei’s model: citizens are not “born”, but rather they “become” by virtue of 
their contribution to the teleological modernization project formulated by the CCP. In                                                         
79 Fei 1992, 24 
80 Madsen 2008, 8 
81 Fei 1992, 26 
82 Ames 2010, 143 
83 Gao 1996, 83 
84 Nosco 2008, 33-34 
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identifying and defining a citizenship characterized by patriotism, dedication, 
integrity and geniality, the CCP are aiming to exploit socially constructed, common 
sense understandings of relationships which stem from Confucian thought. Daily 
interactions in China are projected onto the state-citizen relationship in a manner 
which makes it seem both mundane and natural. 
 
Dreams and Goals: Strictly, Actually, Comprehensively  
While the Chinese Dream is characteristically amorphous, elusive and malleable85, 
the Core Socialist Values campaign defines specific concepts. In a move which 
secured consistency with the outgoing administration of Hu Jintao while 
simultaneously ensuring progression from it, Xi Jinping unveiled Two Centenary 
Goals which characterize the Chinese Dream. The first, of these centenary goals calls 
for the achievement of a moderately prosperous society by the centenary celebrations 
of the founding of the CCP in 2021.  It echoes propaganda from the Hu Jintao era and 
is related specifically to the first national Core Socialist Value: prosperity. The second 
centenary goal, to be realized by 2049 on the centenary of the founding of the PRC, is 
the transformation of China into a nation that is characterized by all four national 
Core Socialist Values: prosperity, democracy, civility and harmony86.   
These Two Centenary Goals are clearly reflected in Xi Jinping’s Four-
pronged Comprehensive Strategy (hereafter Four Comprehensives), the emergent 
guiding philosophy of Xi Jinping which is expected to succeed Hu Jintao’s Scientific 
Outlook on Development.  The Four Comprehensives aim to: comprehensively build a 
moderately prosperous society; comprehensively deepen reform; comprehensively 
govern the nation according to law, and to comprehensively and strictly govern the 
Party87.  
This final element of the Four Comprehensives emphasizing Party governance 
has also been prioritized with its own propaganda campaign. The Three Strict, Three 
Real88 campaign aims to improve Party discipline and cadre conduct, incorporating 
elements of the Core Socialist Values. Cadres are reminded to strictly cultivate their 
moral character; strictly exercise power and authority, and be strict with oneself. 
                                                        
85 Bislev 2015, 586  
86 Xi 2014c, 60 
87 The CCP theroretical journal, Qiushi promotes Xi Jinping’s Four Comprehensives through dedicated 
pages of its website.  Available at: http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/40557/394278/  
88 Dangjian , the CCPPD Journal, dedicates a section of its website to reportage on the Three Stricts, 
Three Real campaign.  Available at: http://dangjian.people.com.cn/GB/136058/395166/index.html 
Page 21 of 46
URL: https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rcra
Critical Asian Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 22
These “Three Stricts” form the foundation of ethical conduct necessary to realize 
three “real” objectives: planning, innovation and integrity. 
The first element of Three Strict, Three Real campaign encourages cadres to 
strictly cultivate moral character, evidencing an appropriation of the Confucian status 
of a morallly superior person which, according to Confucian philosophy, is pursued 
and attained through a process of moral self-cultivation89. Similarly, the demand to be 
strict with oneself constitutes one half of a famous Chinese saying on moral conduct: 
“be strict with oneself, be lenient/generous to others”90. 
 
Citizenship & Confucian Ethics: Tapping into ‘Common Sense’ Understandings 
Feng91 discusses the inter-weaving of Confucian ethical concepts with contemporary 
CCP propaganda concepts. Discussing the six virtues of Confucian ethics, Feng draws 
attention to the Confucian philosophical relationship between virtue and conduct. 
Table 1 shows traditional Confucian ethics: six virtues which can be demonstrated 
through the conduct of six virtuous actions: 
 
Table 1  Six Virtues and Six Virtuous Actions 
 
                                                        
89 Ames 2010  
90 This saying is inspired by the Analects 15:15: “If one sets strict standards for oneself, while making 
allowances for others when making demands on them, one will stay clear of ill will”. See Lau 1979, 
134 
91 Feng 2015 
 
The Six Virtues – 六徳 
Wisdom Benevolence Good 
Faith 
Righteous-
ness 
Loyalty Harmony 
智 仁 信 义 忠 和 
zhi ren xin yi zhong he 
The Six Virtuous Actions – 六行 
Filial 
Piety 
Friendship Kindness Love of 
Kin 
Endurance Charity 
孝 友 睦 姻 任 恤 
xiao you mu yin ren xu 
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The six virtuous actions do not correspond to specific virtues, rather, Confucian 
thought adopts an holistic ethos whereby all six virtuous actions contribute to the 
attainment and demonstration of the six virtues. This interrelationship between virtue 
and conduct is echoed through the citizen-level Core Socialist Values. A sub-
campaign within the Core Socialist Values poster campaign, promoted under the 
heading Great Virtues Illuminate China, mirrors this connection between virtue and 
conduct, forming a tacit relationship between the Core Socialist Values and five 
virtuous actions.  
The Great Virtues Illuminate China campaign contains five virtuous actions 
which borrow from both the six virtues and six virtuous actions associated with 
Confucian thought, intertwining them with aspects of the Core Socialist Values, 
rendering them indistinguishable from traditional Confucian values and conduct. 
Similarly, through drawing on Confucian concepts already absorbed into existing 
common sense understandings, and aligning new concepts with them, this strategy 
makes the adoption of Core Socialist Values less prone to rejection as it merges with 
the existing currents of common sense. 
 
Table 2 Great Virtues Campaign: Five Virtuous Actions  
 
Great Virtues Illuminate China: Five Virtuous Actions 
大德耀中华 (dade yao zhonghua) 
Benevolence Righteousness Honesty Respect Filial Piety 
仁 义 诚 敬 孝 
ren yi cheng jing xiao 
 
The Confucian ethical concepts of benevolence, righteousness and filial piety all 
appear in the Great Virtues campaign. Two further values, honesty and respect appear 
in both the Great Virtues Illuminate China and Core Socialist Values campaigns, 
though not in the original Confucian six virtues or six virtuous actions. Other 
Confucian concepts including harmony and friendship feature extensively on Core 
Socialist Values posters, and to a lesser extent in Great Values Illuminate China 
posters.   
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Table 3  Confucian and Core Socialist Values in Poster Campaigns 
   Confucian Chinese Dream 
 Six 
Virtues 
Six 
Virtuous 
Actions 
 
Great 
Virtues 
Campaign 
 
 
Related to 
Core 
Socialist 
Values 
Appears in 
Core 
Socialist 
Value 
Posters** 
Wisdom 智 zhi !    ! 
Benevolence 仁 ren !  !  ! 
Good Faith 信 xin !    ! 
Righteousness 义 yi !    ! 
Loyalty 忠 zhong !    ! 
Harmony 和 he !   ! National ! 
Filial Piety 孝 xiao  ! !  ! 
Friendship 友 you  ! ! ! Citizen ! 
Kindness 睦 mu  !    
Love of Kin 姻 yin  !    
Endurance 任 ren  !    
Charity 恤 xu  !   ! 
Honesty 诚 cheng   ! ! Citizen ! 
Respect 敬 jing   ! ! Citizen ! 
** Indicates direct reference and use of the characters for each value across several hundred propaganda posters 
made available for download at: http://www.wenming.cn/jwmsxf_294/zggygg/index_12218.shtml . Kindness, 
Love of Kin and Endurance are all represented, but not explicitly through the use of the characters. 
 
The five virtues of the Great Virtues Illuminate China campaign are further integrated 
into propaganda messages alongside explicitly Confucian virtues, increasing their 
appeal to common sense understandings of Confucian ethics. Many propaganda 
posters from the umbrella Chinese Dream campaign align the Confucian concept of 
the morally superior person92 with the role of the citizen referenced in the Core 
Socialist Values.  
Two posters are discussed here: The first poster93 identifies the three virtues of 
a morally superior person as benevolence, wisdom and courage. The second poster94 
introduces the Confucian ethic of righteousness stating that a morally superior person 
embodies righteousness. Of the four virtues contained in the two posters, only 
benevolence is explicitly connected to both the Confucian six virtues and CCP                                                         
92 In Confucian morality and ethics, the ultimate aim of the self-cultivation process, pursued through 
the six virtuous actions, is to become a morally superior person. 
93 The first poster can be viewed at this Baidu link: http://ow.ly/Y4dt305t3Gr  
94 The second poster can be viewed at this Baidu link: http://ow.ly/POYy305t41c  
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propaganda, appearing as a virtue in the Great Virtues Illuminate China campaign. 
The remaining terms of wisdom and righteousness are taken directly from the 
Confucian six virtues, while courage is a Confucian concept that is both dependent 
upon and constitutive of benevolence and righteousness95. 
 Additional propaganda campaigns serve to better illustrate the Core Socialist 
Values in action, with one prominent campaign, Good People, Everyday, launched in 
September 2014, providing daily profiles of citizens from all walks of life who 
embody the values through their social conduct, actively spreading and carrying 
forward the core socialist values96.  Profiles include good sons, good employers, good 
lawyers, good teachers, good cadres, good street cleaners, good doctors, good 
farmers, and even good guys97. A new example of conscientious Chinese citizenship 
is added to the site daily, while a sister site , the China’s Good People List, allows 
netizens to vote from a list of approximately 200 citizen candidates each month 
through a national online and social media campaign98. Profiles of citizens include 
both party members and non-party members, and emphasize their demonstration of 
Core Socialist Values. Filial piety and acts of magnanimous social contribution 
feature prominently, as well as dedication and altruism in serving local communities 
at all levels, with candidates nominated under five categories: Helping People for 
Happiness; Just Heroism; Honesty and Integrity; Dedication and Devotion, and Filial 
Love of Kin. 
 
A Chinese Hegemony with a Confucian Common Sense 
In making the Confucian turn, the CCP under the Xi administration are expanding 
their own interests to encompass those of the people they govern and over whom they 
wish to exert dominance. This constitutes an act of moral and political leadership 
which seeks to resonate with Chinese citizens, reframing their citizenship as 
achievable through conduct which reflects aspects of existing intersubjective 
normative values characteristic of contemporary Chinese society.  While the vast 
majority of Chinese people will not have a deep philosophical or academic 
understanding of Confucianism, they do, nevertheless, share a broadly accepted,                                                         
95 Cua 2008 
96 Good People Everyday is available online at: http://www.wenming.cn/sbhr_pd/hr365/  
97 Good guy refers to young men in their 20s and is a very informal term like “dude” or “bloke” in 
English. China’s Good People List is available at: 
http://archive.wenming.cn/jingtai/sbhr_news/sbhr_zrwl.htm (Accessed 20 April 2016) 
98China’s Good People List and the monthly voting activity is available online at: 
http://archive.wenming.cn/jingtai/sbhr_news/sbhr_zrwl.htm (Accessed 20 April 2016).   
Page 25 of 46
URL: https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/rcra
Critical Asian Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 26
common sense understanding of Confucian values. The Core Socialist Values 
currently being propagated by the CCP aim to find traction with those established 
beliefs, values, dispositions and conventions, and seek to encourage conduct which is 
already viewed as culturally and socially desirable.  
 However, Gramsci conceives of hegemony as a process by which social forces 
and movements can be articulated into a set of strategic alliances which ultimately 
serve the interests of the ruling elite. The Core Socialist Values and the Chinese 
Dream move beyond the simple reflection of shared beliefs to constitute a state 
project to usher in a new cultural order which cements the leadership position of the 
CCP in contemporary China. The CCP under Xi Jinping regards consent to the values 
which it claims characterize the modern Chinese nation, rather than simple 
acquiescence in exchange for economic opportunity, as essential in securing long term 
social stability. Xi makes this explicit in a speech given on an inspection tour 
following the 18th Party Congress in December 2012: 
 
If our 1.3 billion citizens and 82 million Party members as well as 
overseas Chinese can achieve consensus, we will constitute a 
powerful force…We must realize that people from different 
localities and social strata who have different backgrounds and 
occupations think differently. We must therefore consider: where can 
we find consensus? Where can we allow differences to persist? 
Xi Jinping99 
 
Therefore the CCP is compelled to align its interests with the broader interests of the 
Chinese people and differentiated groups; to appeal to them, and to engage in an 
active process of fostering consensus which, taken in tandem with coercive measures, 
pursues a distinctly Chinese hegemony. Through such a process, the CCP aims to 
inculcate Core Socialist Values through encouraging conduct and behaviour which is 
already broadly interpreted as normatively correct. To the extent that, over time, this 
is successful, the absorption of these values into Chinese common sense will be 
realized, forming a relatively durable consensus aimed at conveying a robust stability 
upon the both the CCP and the PRC. However, this is a process that will likely unfold 
over the next several decades, well beyond the term limit of Xi Jinping. As Xi himself                                                         
99 Xi 2014e, 49 
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notes: “Preparatory work must be done. One must not worry about it taking too long, 
for the work will be accomplished in the fullness of time”100. This preparatory work 
finds its catalyst within the doctrine of the Core Socialist Values, with various other 
constructive and coercive strategies helping to prepare the ground for Core Socialist 
Values to flourish, whilst also limiting the potential for alternative to take root.  
 
Towards a Chinese Integral State 
The Chinese Dream, with the Core Socialist Values as its central pillar, represents a 
shift in focus of the Socialism with Chinese Characteristics project to emphasize the 
primacy of cultural power over economic development: of the superstructure over the 
economic base. The Core Socialist Values campaign is accompanied by the increased 
positive and negative intervention of the state in the institutions and structure of 
Chinese civil society, including schools, colleges, universities, state media, online 
media, social media, religious organizations, domestic NGO’s and trade unions. The 
Core Socialist Values represents the ideological doctrine of the state, with the Xi 
administration’s aggressive civil society interventions, both constructive and 
destructive, aimed at providing fertile ground for the negotiation of consensus to that 
doctrine, and complemented by strategic interventions that negate the potential for 
alternative discourses to emerge. While civil society is also potentially the site for 
counter-hegemonic movements to emerge, such is the strategic use of coercive 
interventions, such as legislation and regulation of civil society organizations, that the 
potential for discourses alternative to the Chinese Dream to emerge is reduced almost 
completely. Nevertheless, the limiting of discourse does not itself destroy civil society: 
rather it demonstrates that the integral state, as the sum of political and civil society, 
of coercion and consensus, is a useful lens through which to view contemporary 
China.  
 
Conclusion 
The Core Socialist Values are of profound importance in identifying the potential 
trajectory of political, social and cultural transformation in China over the remainder 
of Xi’s leadership and beyond. They represent a distillation of the state’s vision for 
state-society-citizen relations and a crystallization of values the CCP envision as 
characterizing China in the 21st century. They provide both aspiration, in terms of the                                                         
100 Xi 2014c, 49 
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national and societal values depicted, and expectation, in relation to the duties 
conferred upon Chinese citizens. They also contain formulations of normative 
concepts which challenge and are diametrically opposed to common sense usage of 
the same terms in western liberal thought, including freedom, democracy, civility and 
rule of law.  
 While the overarching intention of the CCP can reasonably be identified as the 
maintenance of its own dominant position, the Core Socialist Values provide evidence 
that this dominance and the CCPs particular brand of authoritarianism will be 
exercised through moral and political leadership as well as through coercive means. 
While easy to dismiss as a cynical and insincere appropriation of Confucian values, 
which may or may not be reducible to political rhetoric, the Core Socialist Values, 
fully backed by the CCP and disseminated through the ideological state apparatus, 
much of which remains under the purview of the state, retain significant 
transformative potential.  This, of course, depends on the extent to which the CCP is 
successful in having its values taken up by those over whom it wishes to exert 
dominance, a fact which alone helps explain the alignment of the CCPs Core Socialist 
Values with Confucian values.    
 In considering why the CCP has devised a configuration of national, societal 
and citizenship values, there are a number of potential factors. Many scholars have 
argued that the basis of the CCP’s legitimacy rests on their ability to continually 
deliver significant economic growth. Double-figure GDP growth characteristic of the 
reform era is unlikely to continue as China enters a new phase of development, with a 
focus on transitioning from export-led manufacturing to a consumer-driven economy. 
With a potentially reduced ability to rely on economic growth as a quid pro quo 
between the Chinese state and its citizens, the Xi administration recognizes the 
precariousness of a consent built on the provision of economic growth and 
opportunity, especially in the current global economic climate. It is clear from several 
speeches by Xi himself that ideological consensus and cohesion around a set of 
distinct values, dispositions and beliefs is the objective of such efforts. While Xi’s 
predecessors have, either deliberately or by virtue of their own Chineseness, sought to 
appeal to and exploit common-sense values, this distillation and crystallization of a 
clear set of national, societal and citizenship values represents a focused effort on 
building normative consensus and shared identity in pursuit of promoting cohesion, 
stability and the consequent strengthening of the CCPs dominant position.  
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 It is essential here to reiterate that consensus should not be equated with 
persuasion.  Citizens in China are presented with a choice: to either resist, in a 
conscious act of defiance, or to participate, either willingly or otherwise, constituting 
an act of consent.  It is here that the complexity of coercion, delivered through the 
repressive state apparatus, limits the scope of potential for resistance to the Core 
Socialist Values. While individuals themselves may be capable of resistance to any 
inculcation of state values, the same is not true for organizations across commerce, 
media and civil society whose very existence increasingly depends on compliance 
with laws and regulations compelling them to operate in accordance with the state 
vision. This mobilization of legislation to negate the potential for alternative 
discourses to arise is a central weapon in facilitating the visibility of the Core 
Socialist Values. Traditional and new media platforms are increasingly unable to 
tolerate content which is potentially in opposition to the Chinese state’s w orld view.  
 This article has sought to analyse of the Core Socialist Values as the ideational 
centerpiece of a reformation of the contemporary Chinese superstructure. The catalyst 
for this process is the crystallization of the values of the ruling state into a coherent 
moral, ethical and ideological vision: a process which is currently unfolding in China 
with the propagation of the Core Socialist Values through the CCP propaganda 
machine. The strategic intertwining of Confucian values with those proscribed in the 
Chinese Dream discourse increases significantly the likelihood that the CCPs values 
will find traction with Chinese people and, over time, become constitutive of common 
sense in contemporary China, though this is a long and arduous process dependent not 
only on the persuasion, but to a great extent on the ability of the authorities to limit 
alternative, counter-discourses. The Core Socialist Values originate with political 
society, yet, in order to be developed into a broad consensus, these ideas must be 
communicated through civil society, defined here as the arena within the integral state 
where consensus is negotiated.   
The Core Socialist Values, as part of a wider grand narrative of the Chinese 
Dream, address the CCP’s most pressing contemporary concerns of citizenship, 
morality and identity and how they impact upon the maintenance of the CCPs position 
of dominance. While the preceding eras of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu 
Jintao have transformed the People’s Republic of China for the 21st century through 
development policies most clearly emphasizing economic transfomation, Xi Jinping’s 
administration has departed from his post-Mao predecessors to elevate the reform of 
the superstructure above that of the economy. While his predecessors have established 
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a modern, revitalized People’s Republic of China for the 21st century, the task which 
befalls Xi Jinping and his administration, and to which these propaganda campaigns 
are wholly committed, is to create Chinese citizens.  
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Appendix 1:  Glossary of Translated Terms  
English Pinyin Chinese 
48 Character Policy 48 zi fangzhen)  
 
48字方针  
 
a nation ruled according 
to the law 
yīfǎzhìguó 依法治国 
a nation ruled by means 
of the law 
yǐfǎzhìguó 以法治国 
actively spreading and 
carrying forward the core 
socialist values 
chuanbo he hongyang 
shehui zhuyi hexin 
jiazhiguan 
积极传播和弘扬社会主
义核心价值观 
actively spreading and 
carrying forward the core 
socialist values 
jiji chuanbo he 
hongyang shehui zhuyi 
hexin jiazhiguan 
积极传播和弘扬社会主
义核心价值观 
be strict with oneself yanyi lvji 严以律己 
be strict with oneself, be 
lenient/generous to others 
yanyi lvji, kuan yi dairen 严以律己，宽以待人 
benevolence  ren 任 
Big Head Son and Little 
Head Dad 
datou erzi xiaotou baba 大头儿子，小头爸爸 CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI)  zhongguo gongchandang zhongyang jilv jiancha weiyuanhui 
中国共产党中央纪律检
查委员会 
CCP Propaganda 
Department (CCPPD)  
zhonggong zhongyang 
xuanchuan bu 
中共中央宣传部  
CCTV zhongyang dianshitai 中央电视台 
Central Guiding 
Committee for Building 
Spiritual Civilization 
(CGCBSC)  
zhongyang jingshen 
wenming jianshe zhidao 
weiyuanhui) 
中央精神文明建设指导
委员会  
charity xu 恤 China Network TV zhongguo wangluo dianshi zhi 中国网络电视制  
China’s Good People List zhongguo haoren bang 中国好人榜 
Chinese Dream zhongguo meng  中国梦 
Chinese Dream Baby  Meng Wa  梦娃 
Chinese Dream, My 
Dream 
zhongguo meng, wo de 
meng 
中国梦，我的梦 
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citizens gongmin 公民 
Civility wenming 文明 
comprehensively and 
strictly govern the Party 
quanmian congyan 
zhidang 
全面从严治党  
comprehensively build a 
moderately prosperous 
society  
quanmian jiancheng 
xiaokang shehui 
全面建成小康社会 
comprehensively deepen 
reform 
 quanmian shenhua gaige 全面深化改革 
comprehensively govern 
the nation according to 
law 
quanmian yi fazhi guo 全面依法治国 
Core Socialist Values shehui zhuyi hexin 
jiazhiguan 
社会主义核心价值观 
Dangjian (CCPPD Journal) dangjian 党建 
Dedication jingye 敬业 
Dedication and Devotion  jingye fengxian 敬业奉献 
deliberative democracy  xieshang minzhu 协商民主 
Democracy minzhu 民主 
differential mode of 
association chaxu geju 差序格局 double designation shuanggui 双规 
endurance ren 任 
Equality pingdeng 平等 
Filial Love of Kin xiao lao ai qin 孝老爱亲  
filial piety (孝 xiao) filial piety (孝 xiao) 孝 
Four-pronged 
Comprehensive Strategy  si ge quanmian zhanlue buju 四个全面战略布局 
Freedom ziyou 自由 
friendship you 友 
geniality youshan 友善 
good cadres hao ganbu 好干部 
good doctors hao yisheng 好医生 
good employers hao laoban 好老板 
good faith xin 信 
good farmers hao nongmin 好农民  
good guys hao xiaohuo 好小伙 
good lawyers hao lvshi 好律师 
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Good People, Everyday  haoren 365 好人 365 
good sons  hao erzi 好儿子 
good street cleaners hao yanglugong 好养路工  
good teachers hao laoshi 好老师  
great cause of the 
people’s (collective) 
freedom to push 
forwards” 
renmin ziyou de weida 
shiye tui xiang qianjin 
人民自由的伟大事业推
向前进 
Great Virtues Illuminate 
China 
Dà dé yào zhōnghuá 大德耀中华 
harmonious society hexie shehui 和谐社会 
Harmony hexie 和谐  
harmony  he 和 headshot miaosha 秒杀 
Helping People for 
Happiness 
bangren wei le 帮人为乐  
honesty cheng 诚 
honesty cheng 诚 
Honesty and Integrity chengshi shouxin 诚实守信  
If one sets strict standards 
for oneself, while making 
allowances for others 
when making demands on 
them, one will stay clear of 
ill will 
gong zi hou er bao zi yu 
ren, zi yuan yuan yi 
躬自厚而薄责于人，则
远怨矣  
Implementation of 
Deepening Development 
of the Education System’s 
Patriotic Education 
zhongong jiaoyubu dangzu 
guanyu jiaoyu xitong 
shenru kaizhan aiguozhuyi 
jiaoyu shishi yijian  
中共教育部党组关于 教
育系统深入开展爱国主
义教育实施意见 
innovation chuangye yao shi 创业要实 
Integrity chengxin 诚信 
integrity zuoren yao shi 
 
做人要实. 
 
Just Heroism jianyi yongwei 见义勇为  
justice  gongzheng 公正 
kindness mu 睦 
love of kin yin 姻 
loyalty zhong 忠 
mass campaign qunzhong yundong 群众运动 
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moderately prosperous 
society 
xiaokang shehui  小康社会  
morally superior person junzi 
 
君子 
morally superior person 
embodies righteousness 
junzi yu yu yi 君子喻于义 Municipal Publicity Department shiwei xuanchuan bu 市委宣传部 Municipal Spiritual Guidance Committee  shiwei wenmingban 市委文明办 
national  guojia 国家 
national conditions guoqing 国情 organizational model of association tuanti geju 团体格局 
patriotism  aiguo 爱国 
People’s Daily  renmin ribao  人民日报 People’s Procuratorate renmin jiancha yuan 人民检察院 
People’s Republic of 
China governs the country 
according to the law and 
establishes the nation 
under socialist rule of law 
zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo shixing yi 
fazhi guo, jianshe shehui 
zhuyi fazhi guojia 
中华人民共和国实行依
法治国，建设社会主义
法治国家 
Pictures Tell Our Values tu shuo women de 
jiazhiguan), 
图说我们的价值观 
planning moushi yao shi 谋事要实 
Prosperity fuqiang 富强  
public information 
advertisements  
gongyi guanggao 公益广告 
Qiushi Journal qiushi zazhi 求是杂志  
rejuvenation of the nation minzu fuxing 民族复兴 
respect jing 敬 
respect jing 敬 
righteousness yi 义 
rule of law fazhi 法治 
rule of man renzhi 人治 
Scientific Outlook on 
Development 
kexue fazhan guan 科学发展观 
self-cultivation (修身 
xiushen) 
self-cultivation (修身 
xiushen) 
修身 
Sina Weibo xinlang weibo 新浪微博 
six virtues liu de 六徳 
six virtuous actions liu xing 六行 
socialist rule of law shehui zhuyi fazhi 社会主义法治 
societal shehui 社会 
Some Major Questions in 
Comprehensively 
zhonggong zhongyan 
guanyu quanmian tuijin yi 
中共中央关于全面推进
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Advancing Governing the 
Country According to 
Rule of Law 
fazhi guo ruogan zhongda 
wenti de jueding) 
依法治国若干重大问题
的决定 
Stressing Civilization, 
Building a New Culture  
jiang wenming shu xinfeng 讲文明树新风 
strictly cultivate their 
moral character 
yanyi xiushen) 严以修身 
strictly exercise power 
and authority 
yanyi yongquan 严以用权 
Tencent WeChat tengxun weixin 腾讯微信 
the people’s freedom renmin ziyou 人民自由 
The Three Strict, Three 
Real 
sanyan sanshi 三严三实 
three virtues of a morally 
superior person 
junzi san de 君子三德 
Two Centenary Goals liang ge yibainian fendou 
mubiao 两个一百年奋斗目标 
western conceptions of 
rule of law 
xifang fazhi 西方法治 
western freedom xifang ziyou 西方自由 
wisdom zhi 智 Xiamen Daily Press Xiamen ribao she 厦门日报社 
Xinhua Media  xinhua she 新华社   
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